Jietong Lin;Xin Wang;

• 1:Institute of New Structural Economics
• 2: Peking University

Abstract：

This paper constructs a model illustrating how irregular political turnover impedes entrepreneurs' response to industrial policies by affecting their expectations on policy stability, thus inhibiting the effectiveness of industrial policies. Empirical analyses based on Chinese Industrial Enterprise Database shows that:(1) industrial policy measured by subsidies significantly improves the TFP of subsidized enterprises, but the effect declines with increasing irregularity of political turnover,(2) the effect is not driven by officials' tenures or local economic conditions,(3) the effect is more pronounced for domestic, private and small enterprises, industries with higher level of investment irreversibility, and in regions with a lower proportion of central-supported industries and lower administrative level, and(4) irregular political turnover influences the incentive effect of industrial policy on enterprises' expansion decisions and investment efficiency.

Key Words：

Abstract:

Keywords:

Foundation:

Authors: Jietong Lin;Xin Wang;

References：

• 陈德球，陈运森.2018.政策不确定性与上市公司盈余管理[J].经济研究，53(6):97-111.Chen D Q,Chen Y S.2018.Policy Uncertainty and Earnings Management by Listed Companies [J].Economic Research Journal,53(6):97-111.(in Chinese) 陈钊，熊瑞祥.2015.比较优势与产业政策效果——来自出口加工区准实验的证据[J].管理世界，(8):67-80.Chen Z,Xiong R X.2015.Comparative Advantage and the Effectiveness of Industrial Policies:Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment on Export Processing Zones [J].Journal of Management World,(8):67-80.(in Chinese) 冯猛.2014.基层政府与地方产业选择——基于四东县的调查[J].社会学研究，29(2):145-169,244-245.Feng M.2014.Local Government and the Development of Local Industries:A case study based on Sidong county [J].Sociological Studies,29(2):145-169,244-245.(in Chinese) 耿曙，庞保庆，钟灵娜.2016.中国地方领导任期与政府行为模式：官员任期的政治经济学[J].经济学(季刊),15(3):893-916.Geng S,Pang B Q,Zhong L N.2016.The Political Economy of the Term Factor in China:The Term of Local Cadres and the Behavior of Local Governments [J].China Economic Quarterly,15(3):893-916.(in Chinese) 顾夏铭，陈勇民，潘士远.2018.经济政策不确定性与创新——基于我国上市公司的实证分析[J].经济研究，53(2):109-123.Gu X M,Chen Y M,Pan S Y.2018.Economic Policy Uncertainty and Innovation:Evidence from Listed Companies in China [J] Economic Research Journal,53(2):109-123.(in Chinese) 韩永辉，黄亮雄，王贤彬.2017.产业政策推动地方产业结构升级了吗?——基于发展型地方政府的理论解释与实证检验[J].经济研究，52(8):33-48.Han Y H,Huang L X,Wang X B.2017.Do Industrial Policies Promote Industrial Structure Upgrading?Theory and Evidence from China's Development-oriented Local Government [J].Economic Research Journal,52(8):33-48.(in Chinese) 李力行，申广军.2015.经济开发区、地区比较优势与产业结构调整[J].经济学(季刊),14(3):885-910.Li L X,Shen G J.2015.Special Economic Zones,Comparative Advantage,and Industrial Structural Transformation [J].China Economic Quarterly,14(3):885-910.(in Chinese) 林毅夫.2012.新结构经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社.Lin Y F.2012.New Structural Economics [M].Beijing:Peking University Press.(in Chinese) 林毅夫.2017.产业政策与我国经济的发展：新结构经济学的视角[J].复旦学报(社会科学版),59(2):148-153.Lin Y F.2017.Industrial Policy and China's Economic Development:From the Perspective of New Structural Economics [J].Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition),59(2):148-153.(in Chinese) 刘军强，鲁宇，李振.2017.积极的惰性——基层政府产业结构调整的运作机制分析[J].社会学研究，32(5):140-165,245.Liu J Q,Lu Y,Li Z.2017.Active Inertia:A Study on the Mechanism of the Restructuring of the Agricultural Industries by the Local Government [J].Sociological Studies,32(5):140-165,245.(in Chinese) 汪德华.2018.财政视角下的产业政策[J].新理财(政府理财),(1):33-34.Wang D H.2018.Industrial Policies from a Fiscal Perspective [J].Government Finance,(1):33-34.(in Chinese) 王海成，张伟豪，夏紫莹.2023.产业规模偏好与企业全要素生产率——来自省级政府五年规划文本的证据[J].经济研究，58(5):153-171.Wang H C,Zhang W H,Xia Z Y.2023.Scale Preference in Industry and Firm's TFP:Evidence from Five-year Plan Texts of Local Governments [J].Economic Research Journal,58(5):153-171.(in Chinese) 杨海生，陈少凌，罗党论，等.2014.政策不稳定性与经济增长——来自中国地方官员变更的经验证据[J].管理世界，(9):13-28,187-188.Yang H S,Chen S L,Luo D L,et al.2014.Policy Instability and Economic Growth:Empirical Evidence from the Turnover of Local Officials in China [J].Journal of Management World,(9):13-28,187-188.(in Chinese) 余靖雯，肖洁，龚六堂.2015.政治周期与地方政府土地出让行为[J].经济研究，50(2):88-102,144.Yu J W,Xiao J,Gong L T.2015.Political Cycle and Land Leasing:Evidence from Chinese Cities [J].Economic Research Journal,50(2):88-102,144.(in Chinese) 张皓辰，王歆，林毅夫.2023.要素禀赋结构与早期工业建设的长期影响[J].经济学(季刊),23(4):1319-1335.Zhang H C,Wang X,Lin Y F.2023.Factor Endowment Structure and the Long-Run Impact of the Early-Stage Industrial Constructions in China [J].China Economic Quarterly,23(4):1319-1335.(in Chinese) 张莉，朱光顺，李世刚，等.2019.市场环境、重点产业政策与企业生产率差异[J].管理世界，35(3):114-126.Zhang L,Zhu G S,Li S G,et al.2019.Market Environment,Key Industrial Policy,and Firm-level Productivity Differences [J].Journal of Management World,35(3):114-126.(in Chinese) 赵婷，陈钊.2019.比较优势与中央、地方的产业政策[J].世界经济，42(10):98-119.Zhao T,Chen Z.2019.Comparative Advantage and Central,Local Industrial Policies in China [J].The Journal of World Economy,42(10):98-119.(in Chinese) 赵婷，陈钊.2020.比较优势与产业政策效果：区域差异及制度成因[J].经济学(季刊),19(3):777-796.Zhao T,Chen Z.2020.Comparative Advantage and Industrial Policy Effect:Regional Differences and Institutional Cause [J].China Economic Quarterly,19(3):777-796.(in Chinese) 朱妍.2019.民营企业营商环境的现状特征、变迁趋势与影响因素——基于第十三次中国私营企业调查数据[J].统一战线学研究，3(2):48-61.Zhu Y.2019.The Current Situation,Characteristics,Change Trend and Influencing Factors of the Business Environment of Private Enterprises:Data Analysis Based on the Thirteenth Survey of Private Enterprises [J].Journal of United Front Science,3(2):48-61.(in Chinese) Aghion P,Cai J,Dewatripont M,et al.2015.Industrial Policy and Competition[J].American Economic Journal:Macroeconomics,7(4):1-32. Ali A M.2001.Political instability,policy uncertainty,and economic growth:An empirical investigation[J].Atlantic Economic Journal.29:87-106. Baker S R,Bloom N,Davis S J.2016.Measuring economic policy uncertainty[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,131(4):1593-1636. Bhattacharya U,Hsu P,Tian X,et al.2017.What Affects Innovation More:Policy or Policy Uncertainty[J]?Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,52(5):1869-1901. Brandt L,Van Biesebroeck J,Zhang Y.2012.Creative accounting or creative destruction?Firm-level productivity growth in Chinese manufacturing[J].Journal of Development Economics.97(2):339-351. Hua X,Wang Y,Xia J,et al.2025.Industrial Policy,Congruence,and Innovation:Evidence from “Chinese NASDAQ” [J].Research Policy,54(8):105298. Ju J,Lin J Y,Wang Y.2015.Endowment structures,industrial dynamics,and economic growth[J].Journal of Monetary Economics,76:244-263. Kydland F E,Prescott E C.1977.Rules rather than discretion:The inconsistency of optimal plans[J].Journal of Political Economy,85(3):473-491. Levinsohn J,Petrin A.2003.Estimating production functions using inputs to control for unobservables[J].The Review of Economic Studies,70(2):317-341. Li G,Li J,Wu Y.2019.Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Firm-level Investment:Finding the Hartman-Abel Effect[J].Journal of Comparative Economics,47(2):441-457. Rodriguez-Clare A.2007.Clusters and comparative advantage:Implications for industrial policy[J].Journal of Development Economics,82(1):43-57. Rodrik D.1991.Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries[J].Journal of Development Economics.36(2):229-242. Rodrik D.2009.Industrial Policy:Don't Ask Why,Ask How[J].Middle East Development Journal,1.
• ① http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20131225/085517745133.shtml。 (1)https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2018531。 (2)“新官不理旧账”可理解为“换了一个官,过去的合同就不算了”,即官员更替引起的政府失信和政策不连续性。详见2018年3月,时任总理李克强在答记者问环节的阐释:http://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/20180321/t20180321_524171838.shtml。 (3)例如,当一个地区的官员更替非常不规律时,官员无法预期自己的政绩会在何时被评估,因此可能会倾向于将产业政策提供给一些能够迅速拉高地区投资,但不一定符合当地比较优势的产业。此时,我们无法分辨产业政策的失效是因为政策提供给了错误的产业,还是因为企业主不愿做出响应。 (4)这一衡量方式能够成立的前提是官员更替的确会带来产业政策的预期外变化。我们通过实证分析发现,官员更替的确会导致产业政策的不连续性,即一个地区在市委书记更替当年的产业政策扶持对象变化幅度比非更替年份更大。限于篇幅,结果留存备索。 (5)篇幅所限,未展示控制变量的描述性统计,结果备索。 (6)将样本中LCA的中位数代入可得,表3第(2)～(4)列中产业政策的边际效应分别为0.003、0.001和0。 (7)限于篇幅,稳健性检验结果留存备索。 (8)限于篇幅,异质性检验结果留存备索。