Yanbing Wu;

• 1:Institute of Economics
• 2: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
• 3:School of Economics
• 4: University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Abstract：

Based on the theory of identity, the paper puts forward the hypothesis of co-promotion between higher-and lower-level government leaders and tests this hypothesis by using the data of prefectural party secretaries and county leaders(county party secretaries and county heads) in Jiangsu province in the period 1983—2020. Employing the difference-in-differences empirical strategy, the results show that in the first and second year after prefectural party secretaries are promoted to important administrative positions in provinces or central ministries, the probability of promotion for county leaders increases significantly. Mechanism analysis shows that with the promotion of prefectural party secretaries, county leaders who used to work together with them have higher probability of promotion, indicating that social network built on actual contacts is the driving force of the co-promotion between higher-and lower-level government leaders.

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Authors: Yanbing Wu;

References：

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• (1)本任上级政府官员晋升到高级别职位后对原组织系统的时任上级政府官员的仕途前景亦可能有影响。为减少问题复杂性、精炼主题,本文聚焦于本任上级政府官员晋升到高级别职位后对原组织系统的时任下级政府官员仕途前景的影响。 (2)因缺乏县官工作经历和学习经历的详细资料,难以识别县官与市委书记的同事关系(在同一单位的工作起止年份存在重叠)、校友关系(毕业于同一学校)。 (3)Shih et al.(2012)发现,若中央委员、中央候补委员与中央高层领导存在同事或老乡或校友关系,则他们在中央委员会中的排名位次显著提升。Jia et al.(2015)发现,若省委书记、省长与中央政治局常委曾是同事关系,则他们的晋升概率显著增加。Opper et al.(2015)构建了省委书记、省长与中央政治局常委的关系指数(由同事、老乡、校友三者加权构成),发现该关系指数对省官晋升有显著正影响。 (4)中国知网可检索全文附录。 (5)中央部门对省级对口部门主要干部人选的影响因部门而异。垂直管理部门:中央部门行使完整人事任免权。双重管理部门:中央部门行使审批否决权、备案审查权。业务指导部门:省委常委会负责人事任免,中央部门可通过备案审查、考核评价等方式施加间接影响。 (6)举例说明如下。在样本期间(1983—2020年),设某人是某市的最后一位由该市市委书记晋升而来的省部高官,其担任省部高官职务至2014年。那么,该市2015—2020年是省部高官职务结束的第1年至第6年。省部高官职务结束第2年及更晚年份合并成职务结束第2年以上。