Xuanyi Zhang;Tianyi Li;Zhengwei Wang;

• 1:Management World Magazine
• 2:Department of Economics
• 3: Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Chinese National Academy of Governance)
• 4:PBC School of Finance

Abstract：

Utilizing a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium(DSGE) model, this paper examines the effects of pension reform in government agencies and public institutions on the demand for commercial endowment insurance. The research indicates that after the reform, the demand for commercial endowment insurance among employees diminishes in the steady state, yet consumption remains stable, suggesting a substitution effect with basic endowment insurance and occupational annuity. In reaction to unforeseen temporary technological shocks, the demand for commercial endowment insurance fluctuates less initially and then more after the reform, compared to the pre-reform period. This occurs because basic endowment insurance and occupational annuity are compulsory, with contributions being a fixed percentage of income, whereas commercial endowment insurance is optional, with employees making contribution decisions based on utility maximization. The varying intensities of their reactions to technological shocks result in different fluctuations in the demand for commercial endowment insurance before and after the reform. Counterfactual simulations indicate that a higher employer contribution rate(or individual contribution rate) for basic endowment insurance correlates with an increased(or decreased) demand for commercial endowment insurance in the steady state. In addition, the higher the employer contribution rate of occupational annuity, the lower the demand for steady-state commercial pension insurance; the higher the individual contribution rate, the lower the demand for steady-state commercial pension insurance. Moreover, minor differences in contribution rates have a limited impact on the volatility of commercial pension demand under technology shocks, thereby leaving room for gradual reform. This paper offers substantial insights into understanding the interplay between various types of endowment insurance and enhancing the pension financial system.

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Authors: Xuanyi Zhang;Tianyi Li;Zhengwei Wang;

References：

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• (1)“双录”政策指的是在保险销售过程实施录音录像同步监控。 (2)资料来源:中国政府网(https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-01/19/content_2806299.htm)。 (3)本模型假设家庭具有代际利他偏好,即个人将父母或子女的效用纳入自己的效用函数内,这将导致财富的代际转移。通过此假设,本模型可以看作两期世代交叠模型的无限期延续,即每个家庭的老年人在下一期去世,人数由Lo变为0;每个家庭的年轻人在下一期变为老年人,人数由Ly减少为Lo;每个家庭在下一期新增Ly个年轻人。 (4)Igt表示代表性家庭年轻人在第t期的平均商业养老保险购买量。本文假设当期购买的商业养老保险在下一期支付养老金,由于商业养老保险资产可以继承,因此第t+1期代表性家庭商业养老保险收入为Ly(1+rgit+1)Igt。Sgt表示代表性家庭在第t期的其他金融资产总投资额。 (5)根据徐敬惠和李鹏(2020)的推算,2004年至2019年15年间,中国家庭的商业保险资产占金融资产的比重保持在10%左右,较为稳定。因此本文模型假设机关事业单位职工家庭的商业养老保险总购买量LyIgt是其他金融资产Sgt的比例ηi。下同。 (6)Ift表示代表性家庭年轻人在第t期的平均商业养老保险购买量。本文假设当期购买的商业养老保险在下一期支付养老金,由于商业养老保险资产可以继承,因此第t+1期代表性家庭商业养老保险收入为Ly(1+rfit+1)Ift。Sft表示代表性家庭在第t期的其他金融资产总投资额。 (7)根据《国务院办公厅关于印发机关事业单位职业年金办法的通知》(国办发[2015]18号)的规定,“职业年金所需费用由单位和工作人员个人共同承担。单位缴纳职业年金费用的比例为本单位工资总额的8%,个人缴费比例为本人缴费工资的4%,由单位代扣。单位和个人缴费基数与机关事业单位工作人员基本养老保险缴费基数一致。”“单位缴费按照个人缴费基数的8%计入本人职业年金个人账户;个人缴费直接计入本人职业年金个人账户。职业年金基金投资运营收益,按规定计入职业年金个人账户。” (8)比例可通过国家统计局公布的情况来计算,16～59岁的劳动年龄人口86481万人,占全国人口的比重为61.3%;60岁及以上人口29697万人,占全国人口的21.1%(https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/fabu/202401/content_6926619.htm)。 (9)比例可通过国家统计局公布的情况来计算,16～59岁人口85798万人,占全国人口的比重为60.9%;60岁及以上人口31031万人,占全国人口的22.0%(http://laoling.cctv.com/2025/01/17/ARTI1YQU2WRMlO75bKSmmyLY250117.shtml)。 (10)数据来源:中国政府网(https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/202405/content_6954834.htm)。