Information Disclosure, Risk Change and Fishing Behavior in Marine: Evidence from Experimental Study Based on the Theory of Public Pool Resources
Jun Luo;Jinshan Liu;Jiaqi Huang;Ronghao Shi;
Abstract:
Under the assumption of rational people and limited common pool resources, individuals will extract as many common pool resources as possible in order to maximize their interests. Marine resources are typical common pool resources. As the number of marine catches increases year by year, the marine environment has been severely damaged. In order to protect marine biological resources and reduce the occurrence of excessive extraction, this paper employs the method of experimental economics to study the individual's extraction behavior of common pool resources by setting up a two-stage experiment in the selection of resources entering the common pool and the number of resources extracted. We also introduce two important factors, information and risk, in the experiment, and study the individual's common pool resource extraction behavior in the face of various risk changes. The experimental results show that the process of information disclosure and risk changes will affect the selection of individual resources and the number of resources extracted to a certain extent. The conclusion can provide policy enlightenment for public governance. For example, disclosing the information on the number of resource extractions can help individuals adjust the number of resource extractions, and formulating corresponding resource management policies according to weather changes can prevent individuals from misjudging risks and leading to irrational extraction behaviors.
Key Words:
Foundation: 国家自然科学基金面上项目(72473125)的资助
Authors: Jun Luo;Jinshan Liu;Jiaqi Huang;Ronghao Shi;
References:
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- (1)当风险水平较高时,被试会根据人们风险厌恶的特性,预期本组选择提取资源的人数较少;相反,当风险水平相对较低时,个体会感觉本组选择提取资源的人数较多。
- Jun Luo
- Jinshan Liu
- Jiaqi Huang
- Ronghao Shi
- School of Economics
- Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
- School of Economics
- Zhejiang University
- Jun Luo
- Jinshan Liu
- Jiaqi Huang
- Ronghao Shi
- School of Economics
- Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
- School of Economics
- Zhejiang University